California’s homeownership rate increased slightly to 54.6% in the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2016. This was up from the homeownership rate of 53.2% experienced in the prior quarter, when it was lower than it had been since the 1980s.
Despite the marginal increase at the end of 2016, the homeownership rate has trended down from its 60.7% peak in 2006 to its present level. California homeownership is certain to languish below California’s historical rate of 55% for years to come. This is due to several factors, including the rise in mortgage rates which began in Q4 2016. Also holding down homeownership is the lack of new residential construction, which has failed to keep up with population growth for the past decade, contributing to the rapid price growth beyond the reach of most homebuyers’ incomes.
Post updated February 17, 2017. Original copy posted November, 2013.
Reflects census data taken at the end of each decade
Chart updated 02/02/15
|2010||2006 peak||1940 low
Chart updated 02/17/17
|2016||2006 peak||1989: 30-year low
|Average Homeownership Rate
Past, present, future
California’s homeownership rate ballooned during the Millennium Boom, but is now free falling. At what point will California’s homeownership rate stabilize, and what factors will contribute to future increases and decreases?
California’s homeownership rate is historically around 10 percentage points below the national homeownership rate (at 63.7% as of Q4 2016). This is due to a combination of factors, including the lesser impact the national policy of pushing the “American Dream” of homeownership has had on more mobile Californians.
California’s rate of homeownership has declined dramatically since the 2008 Great Recession, a drop of nearly seven percentage points since its peak year of 2006. (If underwater homeowners are excluded from the number of homeowners since they have no equity stake in their properties, the California homeownership rate is closer to 50%.)
Understanding the factors which impact California’s low homeownership rate requires an analysis of several economic factors, demonstrated visually through the above charts.
Chart 1: The long view of homeownership
Looking at the century-long view of homeownership rates in Chart 1, you see the effects of related historical events. The most dramatic jump in homeownership followed World War II, between 1950 and 1960, when the percent of homeowners grew from 43% in 1940 to 58% 20 years later, a 33% build-up in homeownership.
While social events springing from the Great Depression and WWII had a strong effect on these numbers, the introduction of Federal Housing Administration (FHA)-insured financing in 1934 was a supporting influence, part of a developing push towards homeownership as a national housing policy. The FHA allowed virtually anyone with a steady income to finance the purchase of a home. Prior to FHA financing, only individuals wealthy enough to qualify with steep 50% down payments had the opportunity to own a home. Sellers frequently supplied the financing without which they could not sell.
Much later, Chart 1 shows the evolution of California’s homeownership rate as three factors are introduced:
- 1982: adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) make their debut in California (regulated variable interest rate mortgages (VIRs) had already been here for a decade);
- 1986: the federal right to borrow against your home equity as though it were an ATM under the Tax Reform Act of 1986; and
- 1997: the inception of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) §121 principal residence profit exclusion.
The easy access to deceptively complex, enticing ARMs (which allow homebuyers to borrow more than they can with fixed-rate mortgages), along with the incentive provided by the principal residence profit exclusion and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, pushed the California homeownership rate beyond historical bounds of 55% to 60.7% in 2006.
This high rate of homeownership, quickly attained, proved unsustainable. Homeowners unqualified to handle ARMs once the rate and payments began to reset defaulted and returned to renting.
Chart 2: Recent movements
In a non-recession market, homeownership rates drop as interest rates move upward to cool the economy, as reflected in the rate of homeownership during the late 1950s through the early 1980s. Chart 2 displays the generally unacknowledged converse relationship between the average 30-year fixed rate mortgage (FRM) rate and the homeownership rate (and home price trends) from early 1980 until 2006, at the beginning of the current Lesser Depression.
However, due to our Lesser Depression brought on by the financial crisis, after 2007 both FRM and homeownership rates have dropped in tandem. Today, the homeownership rate is still stabilizing, a correction of the effects of irresponsible lending during the Millennium Boom (not the fault of FHA or Frannie, but Wall Street bond market independence).
However, by mid-2016 the 30-year FRM rate will again begin to rise consistently, as it did in the ‘60s and ‘70s, and with that move, the homeownership rate will continue to lose strength before it fully stabilizes.
For the next 25 years or so, and in reverse of the direction taken during the past 30 years, interest rates will rise and this will inhibit homeownership – as occurred in the 1960-1980 period. The Fed intentionally raises short-term interest rates to deliberately induce a business recession when the economy is over performing. The effects usually take hold in two to three years. More precisely, the recession sets in around 12 months after short-term rates rise above long-term rates.
This cyclical action has occurred periodically since WWII, until the early 2000s, when the Fed skipped the second phase of this action due to the events of September 11.
Just as the recession’s magic was removing inefficiencies in the economy, fiscal and monetary moves post-9/11 led directly to the Millennium Boom. In the boom, as aided and abetted by financial deregulation, low-tier home prices were artificially driven to a three-fold high. A new real estate paradigm was prematurely declared in which prices would go up and up forever, in defiance of economic principles. Bond rating agencies, properly induced by Wall Street Bankers, fully endorsed the concept. Of course, this false paradigm came crashing down in 2007, and we have been in recession and recovery mode ever since.
The Fed finally increased interest rates in December 2015. However, fixed rate mortgages (FRMs) won’t rise for several more months. This is due to a number of complex global economic factors at work. Namely, economic chaos in much of the world has caused a lack of available “safe” investment opportunities. One investment opportunity deemed reasonably safe is the government’s 10-year Treasury (T-) Note. As long as many global markets remain unstable, foreign investors will continue to invest in the 10-year T-Note, keeping it and other rates tied to to it – like FRM rates – low.
Apart from the effects of the interest rate cycle of rising and falling rates, the evolving societal mores of the younger generation show an increasing tendency towards renting, rather than owning, one’s shelter.
Looking forward on another plain, the homeownership rate will stabilize when California’s employment level reaches its 2007 pre-recession peak.
While jobs finally returned to the December 2007 peak in the second half of 2014, it will take until 2019 to reach the percentage of California’s population employed in 2007, since we experienced a nearly 10% population increase from 2007 through 2016. This factor will boost residential construction.
Finally, the high number of short sales, trustee’s sales and bankruptcies, while now past, will continue to have a lingering effect on the homeownership rate. The reduction of demand by removal of these displaced homeowners is the culprit.
Personal bankruptcies, which spiked during the recession, have dropped slightly since then. Historical evidence displays a jump in bankruptcies and homeowner strategic default just before the conclusion of a recovery, which has yet to arrive. It is at this time of improved confidence that homeowners will walk away to start anew, finally realizing their underwater homes will not soon emerge into positive equity territory. Expect to see bankruptcies and strategic defaults increase at the tail end of the current recovery, probably around 2017.